University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2005

The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/42

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons
Recommended Citation
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. "The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility." Del. J. Corp. L. 30, no. 3 (2005): 767-818.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE CYCLICAL TRANSFORMATIONS
OF THE CORPORATE FORM:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
BY REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH*
ABSTRACT

This article describes the transformations underwent by the
corporateform from its Roman origins to the present. It shows that every
time there was a shift in the role of the corporation,three theories of the
corporation (the aggregate, artificial, and real entity theories) were
broughtforward in cyclicalfashion. Every time, however, the real entity
theoryprevailed,andit was the dominanttheory duringperiodsofstability
in the relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the
state. The article describes this evolution in detail, and then attempts to
derive normative consequences for the legitimacy of corporate social
responsibility(CSR). The basic argumentis thatunder the realentity view,
which is historically the dominant view of the corporation, CSR is
normatively acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-run
welfare of the shareholders.
I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2001, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce with an impassioned plea for business to "take
concerted action against the unparalleled nightmare of AIDS."' After
discussing the dimensions of the global AIDS crisis, the Secretary General

*Irwin I. Cohn Professor ofLaw, The University ofMichigan Law School. I would like
to thank Steve Bank, Michael Barr, Suzie Blumenthal, Yariv Brauner, Merritt Fox, Rich
Friedman, Bruce Frier, Tom Green, Jon Hanson, David Hasen, Don Herzog, Jim Hines, Morty
Horwitz, Doug Kahn, Vic Khanna, Marjorie Kornlauser, Rich Lavoie, David Lenter, Kyle Logue,
David Schizer, Joel Slemrod, Joe Vining, Jim Walsh, Mark West, JB White, and participants at
workshops at Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, and Northwestern Law Schools and the Brookings
Institution for their comments on this and previous versions of this article, and Dganit Sivan for
outstanding research assistance.
Some sources cited in this article were unable for review by the Delaware Journal of
Corporate Law but have been verified by the author.
'Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Urges United States Business
Leaders to Take Concerted Action Against "Unparalleled Nightmare" of AIDS, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/7827,AIDS/13 (June 1, 2001), availableat http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/
sgsm7827.doc.htm.
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went on to argue that business leaders should get involved in the campaign
to stop the spread of AIDS "because AIDS affects business.., the business
community needs to get involved to protect its bottom line.., there is a
pay you for, and what
happy convergence between what your shareholders
2
is best for millions of people the world over."
The problem with this appeal is that it is unlikely to be true for the
majority of Mr. Annan's audience. It is hard to show that combating the
AIDS crisis in Africa will have any discernible impact on the bottom line
for shareholders of an office equipment manufacturer in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. In fact, a recent review of the literature on corporate social
responsibility (CSR), the code name for all the various ways for-profit
enterprises can help their communities and the world, has shown that it is
any significant positive correlation between CSR
very hard to demonstrate
3
line."
"bottom
the
and
On the other hand, it is also clear that in many cases, corporations are
in a better position to help human development than either governments or
not-for-profit organizations. Corporations are typically smaller and more
efficient than unwieldy government bureaucracies and, in the developing
world, are also less corrupt. Further, corporations possess greater
resources, both financial and technical, than most not-for-profit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Thus, an important question arises: given that corporations are
frequently in the best position to help human development, should they be
permitted to do so when there is no clear benefit for their shareholders?
This is a question that has been frequently addressed by academics in the
last half century, and overwhelmingly they have answered in the negative.
From Theodore Levitt's classic 1958 article on "The Dangers of Social
Responsibility"4 to Milton Friedman's influential New York Times magazine
article in 1970,5 to current writings by Michael Jensen and others,6 the
2

1d.

3

Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh, Misery Loves Companies:Rethinking Social
Initiatives by Business, 48 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 268, 278 (2003).
'Theodore Levitt, The Dangersof Social Responsibility, HARV. Bus. REv. 41 (Sept.-

Oct. 1958).
'Milton Friedman, The SocialResponsibilityofBusiness is to Increase its Profits,N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33.
6
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); Michael C. Jensen & William
Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). For different perspectives on CSR in general, see William
T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception ofthe Business Corporation,14 CARDOzO L. REv. 261
(1992); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw: The LegitimatingSchemas ofModern
Policy and CorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004); Michael J. Philips, Reappraisingthe
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consensus is that "social responsibility of business ...[is] to increase its
profits."7 The reasons given are first, that since management are deploying
the shareholders' money, they should not be permitted to do so in ways that
and second, that
do not directly benefit the shareholders;'

RealEntity Theory of the Corporation,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061 (1994); C.A. Harwell Wells,
The Cycles ofCorporateSocial Responsibility:An HistoricalRetrospectivefor the Twenty-first
Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002); Cynthia A. Williams, CorporateSocial Responsibility in
an Era of Economic Globalization,35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002).
7
Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 37.
'See, e.g., Kenneth J.Arrow, Social Responsibility andEconomic Efficiency, 21 PUB.
POLICY 303, 303-07 (1973); Friedman, supra note 5, at 122; Friedrich A. Hayek, The
Corporationin a DemocraticSociety, in WHOSE INTEREST OUGHT IT AND WILL IT BE RUN, IN
MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATIONS 99, 108-15 (Melvin Anshen & George L. Bach, eds., 1960).
The classic case affirming this "shareholder primacy" doctrine is Dodge v. FordMotor Co., 170
N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). See also the classic debate between Berle and Dodd. Adolph A.
Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1061 (1931) (stating
directors' powers one held in trust for the shareholders as the only beneficiaries of the
corporation); Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees, 45 HARV.L. REV.
1145, 1147-48 (1932) (stating Berle does not think that shareholder profit maximization is the
only purpose that corporations exist); Adolph A. Berle, For Whom Are CorporateManagers
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (stating profit maximization is not the only
purpose of a corporation). The shareholder primacy doctrine has become a mainstay of modern
corporate law. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15-22 (1991) (stating that shareholders, as residual claimants,
have implicitly contracted for promise that firm will maximize profits in long run); HENRY G.
MANNE & HENRY C. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972)
(noting that social responsibility of corporations is shareholder wealth maximizing); Bernard
Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-EnforcingModel of CorporateLaw, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911,
1921 (1996) (arguing that principal goal of corporate law is to maximize shareholder wealth);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistoryforCorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
441,449-51 (2001) (stating that shareholder primacy is likely to dominate future development of
corporate law); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes andAccountability of the Corporationin
ContemporarySociety: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads,62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
9, 11 (1999) (examining how the changing dynamic of business organizations impacts and
influences the relationship between corporate governance and its constituents); Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, FictionalShareholders:For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees, Revisited,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996) ("[A]II but the communitarians agree that virtually the sole
task of corporate law is to ensure that managers act as agents for the shareholder owners.");
Roberta Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113 (1987)
(asserting that core goal of corporate law is to maximize equity share prices); cf LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 201-16 (2004) (discussing need to align managerial incentives with
shareholder interests); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a
Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1496 (1990) (discussing role of stakeholders in firm).
For arguments on the other side, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310-11 (1999) (positing that where shareholders
are widely dispersed, shareholders' voting rights are practically meaningless, given collective
action problems, shareholders' rational apathy, and the power top managers exercise in nominating
the candidates for the board and in otherwise shaping the voting agenda); David Millon, Theories
of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 261-62 (praising case law that reaffirms directors'
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permitting more than one measure of managerial success would enhance
the agency cost problem and make it impossible to evaluate managers with
any reasonable degree of objectivity.9
And yet, the debate persists because most managers, in fact, do want
to engage (or at least appear to engage) in CSR, arguing (in the face of the
evidence) that this is in the "long run" benefit of the shareholders.' °
Moreover, they are permitted to do so by the ALI Principles of Corporate
Governance, which state that "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder
gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its
business . . .[m]ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."" This
formulation represents a compromise between the wishes of management
for maximum freedom and the consensus of corporate law academics.
This article will attempt to shed a new light on this debate by putting
it in historical perspective. Historically, the corporation evolved from its
origins in Roman law in a series of four major transformations. First, the
concept of the corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or
members had to be developed, and this development was only completed
with the work of the civil law Commentators in the fourteenth century. By
the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation-a corporation
with several members who chose others to succeed them--had legal
personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear
criminal responsibility), unlimited life, and was well established in both

discretion to consider nonshareholder interests); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
PracticalFrameworkforEnforcing CorporateConstituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579,63043 (1992) (arguing that courts should modify corporate law to grant stakeholders standing to sue
directors when the former are harmed by corporate action); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human
CapitalEra:ReconceptualizingCorporateLaw to FacilitateLabor-ManagementCooperation,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936-65 (1993) (arguing that corporate law should be changed to
encourage employee representation on the board and standing to sue); Williams, supranote 6, at
712 n.15 (stating that it is "debatable whether Hansmann and Kraakman's statement about
shareholders' control ofthe corporation is accurate in the United States; in fact, one of the striking
features of American corporate law is how little real control shareholders have, given that they
are the 'owners' of the corporation"). See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (surveying recent nontraditional approaches to corporate legal scholarship);
Chen & Hanson, supra note 6, at 37-39; Developments in the Law-CorporationsandSociety,
HARV. L. REV.2176, 2176-77 (2004).
9
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 5, at 133; Wells, supra note 6, at 106.
"5Margolis & Walsh, supra note 3, at 270. On CSR as mere whitewashing, see Andrew
A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical
Industry's Responsible CareProgram,43 ACAD. MGMT. J.698 (2000).
"1AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2.0 1(b) (1994). See also The Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate
Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW 241, 244 (1990) (recognizing that
corporations serve the interests of both its shareholders and society).
HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 765 2005
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civil and common law jurisdictions. The second important step was the
shift from non-profit membership corporations to for-profit business
corporations, which took place in England and the United States in the end
of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations
whose shares are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of
limited liability and freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last
major transformation was from corporations doing business in one country
to multinational enterprises whose operations span the globe, which began
after World War II and is still going on today.
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more
temporary change which occurred in the United States in the 1980s with the
advent of hostile takeovers) was accompanied by changes in the legal
conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is that
throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the same three
theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories include the
aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its
members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the
corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which
views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of
the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers. 2
In this article, we will describe the transformations underwent by the
corporate form from its Roman origins to the present. In addition, we will
show that every time there was a shift in the role of the corporation, all
three theories were brought forward in cyclical fashion. Every time the real
entity theory prevailed, however, for reasons we will discuss below, it was
the dominant theory during periods of stability in the relationship between
the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. This evolution will be
described in detail, and then an attempt will be made to derive normative
consequences for the legitimacy of CSR. The basic argument is that under
the real view, which will be argued is historically the dominant view of the
corporation, CSR is normatively acceptable even when it does not
contribute to the long-run welfare of the shareholders.
The article is divided into three parts. After this Introduction, Part
II describes the evolution of the corporate form from Roman law to the
present, and shows how in each of the four transformations undergone by
the corporation all three theories tended to arise, but that the real theory
ended up as the dominant one. Part III draws the normative conclusions,
2

1

These three theories are the standard ones in the literature. See, e.g., Millon, supra

note 8, at 201.
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and argues that if indeed the real theory is the dominant theory of the
corporation from a historical perspective, it provides a new way of
justifying CSR, even when it is does not benefit the shareholders and
involves problems for which the corporation is not responsible, like the
AIDS crisis. In addition, Part III puts the three theories of the corporation
into a comparative perspective, drawing on the "varieties of capitalism"
literature, and argues that each theory exemplifies one type of capitalist
structure. This, in turn, explains the different attitudes to CSR in different
contemporary capitalist environments.
II. THE CYCLICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CORPORATE FORM

The corporation as a legal person separate from its owners is a
uniquely Western institution. Other legal systems, such as Muslim law, did
not (before they were influenced by the West) have a concept of legal
personality separate from individual human beings. 3 The corporate form
originated in Roman law in its classical period (the first two centuries AD),
was further developed in the Middle Ages in both canon (Church) and civil
law, and was adopted from civil law by the Anglo-American common law
tradition.
In the West, the existence of the corporate form was crucial to the
development of several other important institutions, such as the university
(whose very name derives from the Latin term for corporation, universitas)
and Parliament. It has, in fact, been argued that other important Western
developments such as the rise of representative democracy and the
scientific revolution can be tied to the corporate form. 4
To get from the Roman origins of the corporate form to today's
multinational enterprises, the corporation had to undergo the four
transformations described above. In this Part, we will describe these
transformations in detail. In addition, we will show that every time there
was a shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories (the aggregate,
artificial entity, and real entity theories) were brought forward in cyclical
fashion. Every time the real entity theory prevailed, however, for reasons
discussed below, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability
in the relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state.
3

See GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES (1981); George Makdisi, Madrasaand
University in the Middle Ages, 32 STUDIA ISLAMICA [ISLAMIC STUDIES] 255 (1970).
4
'O n representative democracy and its connection to the borough as a corporation, see,
e.g., GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1964); BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION,
LAW, AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650 (1982). On the link between
the rise of universities in the West and the scientific revolution, see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, THE
ARISTOTELIAN REVOLUTION (1986).
1
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A. FirstTransformation: The Establishment
of the Corporationas a Legal Person
Scholars have been debating for a long time whether classical Roman
Law had, in fact, developed a concept of the corporation as a legal person
with legal attributes (owning property, the capacity to sue and be sued)
separate not just from its members as individuals but also from its members
as a group.' 5 The classical texts are, in fact, ambiguous and reflect different
views." But one can already discern in them the three views of the
corporation outlined above.
The artificial entity view, for example, is reflected in the following
excerpt from the classical jurist Gaius:
Partnerships, collegia, and bodies of this sort may not be
formed by everybody at will; for this right is restricted by
statutes, senatus consulta, and imperial constitutiones. In a
few cases only are bodies of this sort permitted. For example,
partners in tax farming, gold mines, silver mines, and salt
works are allowed to form corporations. Likewise, there are
certain collegia at Rome whose corporate status has been
established by senatus consulta and imperial constitutiones,
for example, those of the bakers and certain others and of the
shipowners, who are found in the provinces too. Those
permitted to form a corporate body consisting of a collegium
or partnership or specifically one or the other of these have
the right on the pattern of the state to have common property,
a common treasury, and an attorney or syndic through whom,
be transacted and done in common
as in a state, what should
7
is transacted and done.'

"5PATRICK W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1938) argues in the
affirmative; FRITZ SCHULTZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 88-102 (1951), and OTTO GIERKE,
ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES 128-31 (George
Heiman, trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977), in the negative.
6
These texts are taken from the CorpusJuris Civilis,the major compilation of Roman
Law performed under the Emperor Justinian in 528-534 AD. The Corpus Juris Civilis consists
of three parts: The Institutes (Inst.), an introduction to the law in general; the Digest (Dig.), a
collection of pronouncements of individual jurists, mostly from the classical period (the first two
centuries AD); and the Code (Code), a collection of imperial statutes. The views of the classical
jurists thus come to us in fragmentary fashion, and with the possibility of later editing or
interpolation, so it is hard to be sure what any classical jurist actually said. For the Digest, the
text edited by Mommsen and Krueger and translated by Alan Watson (1985) was used.
7
Dig. 3.4.1 pr.-1 (Gaius, Provindial Edict 3) (Alan Watson trans. 1985).
HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 768 2005
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The emphasis here is on the authority granted to the various types of
corporations by the state: without imperial permission, they could not have
legal personality, own property, or have an agent who can act in their name.
In fact, we know from other sources that the Roman emperors were
suspicious of private corporations, especially in the provinces, as
potentially seditious, and refused permission to set up such corporations
even for seemingly innocuous purposes."
The aggregate view of the corporation as equivalent to its members
acting collectively is reflected in the following excerpt from the classical
jurist Paul:
Citizens of a municipality can possess nothing of themselves,
because the consent of all is not possible. Hence, they do not
possess the marketplace, public buildings, and the like, but
they use them in common. The younger Nerva, however, says
that they can both possess and usucapt through a slave what
he has acquired through his peculium; there are, however,
those who think differently, since the citizens do not own the
slaves themselves. 9
This refers to the Roman concept of possession (possessio), which requires
animus and corpus, the intention to possess and the capacity to hold;2" Paul
is saying that since the members of a corporation cannot have a single
animus, they cannot actually own anything. 2' A similar aggregate view can
also be discerned in the excerpt from Gaius cited above, where he discusses
the members acting collectively through an agent. The same view is also
8

See, e.g., Emperor Trajan's refusal to allow Pliny to set up a voluntary fire brigade
at Nicomadea for fear it may be breeding ground for anti-Roman sedition. Pliny the Younger,
Letters and Panegyricus 1.33-34 (Betty Radice trans., Harvard U. Press 1969); FRANCESCO M.
DE ROBERTIS, IL FENOMENO AsSOCIATIVO NEL MONDO ROMANO [THE ASSOCIATIVE
PHENOMENON IN THE ROMAN WORLD] (198 1); SCHULTZ, supra note 15, at 97.
9
Dig. 41.2.1.22 (Paul, Edict 54) (Alan Watson trans. 1985). This could be interpreted
as saying that the municipal corporation itself possesses the property (supporting the real view),
but this is not how the text was read in the Middle Ages. See infra text accompanying notes 2738.
20
Dig. 41.2.3.1 (Alan Watson trans. 1985); cf WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK
OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 199-202 (3d rev. ed. by Peter Stein, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1972).
"In another text, however, he seems to imply that the agent can act for the collective:
"A legacy was left to townships, if they took an oath. The condition is not impossible of
fulfillment. But how can the towns comply with it? The oath will be sworn by those who conduct
the town's affairs." Dig. 35.1.97 (Paul, Neratius 2) (Alan Watson trans. 1985). Ulpian, on the
other hand, believed that corporate bodies can be guilty of crimes that require intent. See Dig.
4.2.9.1 (Ulpian, Edict 11) (intimidation); but cf Dig. 4.3.15.1 (Ulpian, Edict 11) (fraud).
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reflected in the classical prohibition against instituting corporate bodies as
heirs because they are "uncertain"-their membership is changing.22
The real view, finally, is mostly reflected in the excerpts of the
classical jurist Ulpian. For example:
If members of a municipality or any corporate body appoint
an attorney for legal business, it should not be said that he is
in the position of a man appointed by several people; for he
comes in on behalf of a public authority or corporate body,
not on behalf of individuals.23
Ulpian here uses universitas (corporate body) as equal to the municipes
(members), and speaks of the representative as acting for the corporate
body rather than on behalf of the "individuals," which can be consistent
with the aggregate view; but he also states that the representative does not
act for the "several people," which favors the real entity view that he acts
for the corporation itself. Similarly, he states elsewhere that:
[i]t has very frequently been written in rescripts that a slave
belonging to a municipality [may] be tortured in capital cases
affecting the citizens because he is not their slave but the
state's, and the same should be said of other slaves belonging
to corporate bodies; for the slave appears to belong, not to a
number of individuals, but to the body [itself]. 24
This text likewise reflects Ulpian's real entity view of the corporation as
separate not just from the individual members but also from the "number
of individuals" in aggregate. A slave could not be tortured to give evidence
against its master, but he could if the master was a corporation.2 5

22

Neither municipalities nor the members of a municipality can be instituted as heirs,

because they are uncertain bodies, and cannot all decide to enter the inheritance nor act as an heir,
so as to become heirs. EPITOME OF ULPIAN'S REGULAE 22.5. If this fourth century Epitome
actually reflects Ulpian's views (which is unclear), it seems inconsistent with other excerpts from
his writings, which reflect a real entity view of the corporation. This prohibition was gradually
relaxed by various emperors and was finally abolished in 469 AD. See Code Just. 6.24.8
(Diocletian & Maximian 290 AD); Code Just. 1.12.1 (Arcadius & Honorius 321 AD); Code Just.
6.24.12 (Leo 469 AD).
23
Dig. 3.4.2 (Ulpian, Edict 10).
24
Dig. 48.18.1.7 (Ulpian, Duties of Proconsul 8).
25
Similarly the concept of limited liability: "A debt to a corporate body is not a debt to

individuals and a debt of a corporate body is not a debt of individuals." Dig. 3.4.7.1 (Ulpian,
Edict 10). But this text is more ambiguous because it can be interpreted as distinguishing the
debts owed by the individual members from debts owed by them as a group. See also Gaius Inst.
HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 770 2005
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Finally, consider the following:
As regards decurions or other corporate bodies, it does not
matter whether all the members remain the same or only some
or whether all have changed. But if a corporate body is
reduced to one member, it is usually conceded that he can sue
and be sued, since the rights of all have fallen to one and the
corporate body continues to exist in name only.26
In this text Ulpian envisages the corporate body as remaining unchanged
as the membership changes, and he even considers the possibility of a
"corporation soul." This is the clearest evidence of the real entity view in
the Roman texts; but note that not even Ulpian could imagine a corporation
continuing to exist without any members.
The same debate continued through the Middle Ages. Consider the
following examples, which come from the OrdinaryGloss by Franciscus
Accursius (1182-1258) written around 1250, which summarized the
previous century's work by the jurists in Bologna commenting on the
Corpus Juris Civilis.
First, the artificial entity view:
Of others: Which are many: The congregation of any city,
village or castle . . . similarly any congregation to uphold
justice, such as the Tuscan scholars or the entire university
... similarly religious congregations.... And because certain
societies are permitted, as the text says, it is clear that
normally they are prohibited.... But can a society, such as
that of scholars living in one inn, appoint an agent [to sue]?
It seems they can, if the case is the society's, as it is a
permitted society."
Here, Accursius emphasizes the need for a society to get permission from
the state to have legal personality, just as Gaius did in the text he was
commenting upon. The identity of the state has changed (the Bolognese

2.11: What is public is considered to be nobody's property, because it is believed to belong to the
corporate body itself. Private goods belong to individual people. Again, the distinction is
between property owned by individuals and the collective.
26
Dig. 3.4.7.2 (Ulpian, Edict 10).
27
FRANCIscus ACCURSIUS, GLOSSA ORDINARIA [ORDINARY GLOSS] (1658) on Dig.
3.4. 1.1 (cited above) v. aliorum. The translation of this and other medieval texts is the author's.
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jurists professed allegiance to the German emperors), as did the identity of
the corporations, but the concept is similar.
The aggregate view can be seen in Accursius' definition of the agent
as "Syndicus: Who acts for any corporate body, but only for the many...
for he is called syndicus because he argues (dicens) cases for the single
ones (singulorum)."2 8 Here the agent is seen as speaking for the members
as a collective, as opposed to the members as individuals.29 Similarly,
Accursius rejected the concept of limited liability, requiring the members
to be liable for debts of the corporation, which again reflects the aggregate
view.3" And he allows departing members to take their share, although not
of inheritances or other property that belonged to the corporation itself.3
In yet other locations, the real entity view predominates, even when
it requires challenging the Roman authorities. For example, "The people
are called by trumpet or by bell or by voice, and even though they do not
all come, the majority of two thirds can consent. . . . Thus this law
cannot all will together easily. . . . But they can with
conceives they
2

difficulty.

3

It is as if [Paul] said not easily, because they cannot will
together easily.., but they can with difficulty, so as when a
bell is tolled, because all are considered to have done what the
council or a majority did .

.

.

and they can commit

intimidation.., and obtain possession... and elect a tribune

28

1d. on D.3.4.1.1 (cited above) v. syndicum.
See also id. on Code 10.31.30 v. reipublicae: "And say that they all act through the
agent or syndicus whom they elect"; id.on Dig. 3.4.2 v. haberi (cited above): "An agent stipulates
for the corporate body, not for its individual members."
30
"But what if they have nothing common to satisfy creditors? They must be compelled
to make collections so that they will have something in common." ACCURSIUS, supra note 27, on
Dig. 3.4.1.2 v. proconsul.
3 "Or say that whatever colleges and corporate bodies have also belongs to the single
29

[members], and whoever withdraws receives his portion, because they have something in common
through combining goods of the individual members ... but when a legacy is left to a college or
a town, it is left only to those who are members of the college, and they divide it, so that if anyone

withdraws, he receives nothing, because it does not belong to the single individuals [as such], but
to the town's citizens or to the members of the college." ACCURSIUS, supra note 27, on Dig.
47.22.1.1 v. competit. "But what if the corporate body is dissolved, can any member demand his
portion as a proper and private debt? [Yes], because that is the rule [when the body still exists],
here therefore even more so.... But if some corporate body has a common grove that is otherwise
undivided, should the creditors be given possession of that part that seems to belong to them? I

do not think so, because neither the grove nor any part thereof belong to anybody." Id., on Dig.
3.4.7.1 v. non debetur.
32Id., on Dig. 50.160.1 v. refertur (citing Dig. 41.2.1.22 (cited above)).
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or leader . . . for this question
notes the rarity, not the
33
impossibility [of doing SO].
Here Accursius rejects Paul's view that corporate bodies cannot own
anything because they cannot will together, referring to the notion that the
majority of the members can act for the corporate body.34 Likewise,
What if a member of a corporate body injures you, can the
corporate body be said to have done it and be sued by you?
It seems that not, because he did it out of his own will, not as
a corporate body, i.e., after deliberation and sounding a bell
or having been otherwise gathered together. On the contrary,
yes, because a corporate body is nothing more than the people
who are there."
The last sentence clearly reflects the aggregate view. When Accursius
considers the question of what happens when the membership changes,
however, he seems to reject the aggregate view in favor of the real entity
view:
Some say that goods that belong to a college belong to the
people, or to many single individuals.., but they do not
concede that if those [individuals] die the people is dead,
because others are considered (finguntur)to take their place.
Thus the emitted cry perishes, but not your voice. But what
is argued to the contrary, that the goods do not belong to

"Id., on Dig. 4.3.15.1 v. facere possunt (cited above).
34
Similarly: "They are like one body, whether all are present or whether two thirds are,
and whatever the majority of this present body does, is valid." ACCURSIus, supra note 27, on Dig.
3.4.3 v. due partes: "[Rogerius said that] members of municipalities cannot possess, but those to
whom the administration of the members is entrusted.... [Accursius]: They can properly possess
through those to whom the municipality's affairs are entrusted." Id., on Dig. 41.2.1.22 v.
adquiratur (cited above). Accursius also makes a distinction between what can happen naturally
and "by law": "Here it is doubted whether they can all swear by nature, but similarly children and
others who are like a corporate body, who cannot swear by nature, but can by law." Id, on Dig.
35.1.97 v. geruntur (cited above). And he rejects the notion that corporate bodies are "uncertain":
"It is no objection that a corporate body is said not to be able to consent, because it should be
understood as 'easily' ... or add by the order of those who manage the corporate body." Id., on
Dig. 29.2.25.2 v. adibit; see also id., on Dig. 4.2.9.1 v. collegium (corporate bodies can be guilty
of fraud and intimidation).
35
ACCURSIUS, supranote 27, on Dig. 3.4.7.1 v. non debetur (above).
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single individuals, is true, as can be proven by the law against
torturing slaves.36
This text conceives of the membership corporation as unchanging even
though the individual members change. This could still be consistent with
the aggregate view (the membership remains as a collective), but the
rejection of the view that the goods belong to many single individuals and
the citation to Ulpian suggests the real entity view.
Finally, consider the following:
Even though a single person cannot be a corporate body, he
still retains the rights of the corporate body, even though a
single person cannot constitute a corporate body initially, but
only three persons.... But can he appoint a syndicus, who
argues cases for the many, or [at least] for two? It seems so.
. . . But what if nobody at all remains, [asks] Johannes
[Bassianus]? The college is then dissolved, and the goods
belong to nobody, like inherited goods. But if thereafter by
authority of the Pope or whoever is in charge of that college,
someone is appointed to that college, by the artifice of the law
the goods are considered (fingitur)to belong to him.... Even
though some Bishop Moses said that the walls themselves
possess even during the existence of the college, which seems
very difficult to say and contrary to the law. To the contrary,
in no way do the goods belong to anyone, but once the college
has been dissolved, by the law they belong to the fisc or the
Pope.... But it can be said for Moses, that the church is
frequently called the place itself which is surrounded by walls
and consecrated; and it is also said that the church can have
rights and possess and sue.., thus the location itself, or the
walls, possess even while the college exists, through the
priest, like a private person through an agent.37
In this gloss on Ulpian, Accursius goes beyond his Roman source to ask
(following his predecessor Johannes Bassianus) what happens if all
members of a corporation die. He then resorts to the artificial entity theory
to argue that the state should appoint a replacement; alternatively, he states

36

1d., on Dig. 47.22.1.1 v. competit.

'Id., on Dig. 3.4.7.2 v. nomen universitatis (cited above).
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that the college ceases to exist, consistent with the aggregate view.38 But
he also mentions the possibility that the "location" of the corporation
continues to exist, which is closer to the real entity view. There is no
resolution: all three views co-exist in this text.
A hundred years later, however, the real entity view comes to
predominate. This can be seen in the following examples from the work of
Bartolus of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the most important of the
Commentators, who were the generation that followed the Glossators in
further developing the interpretation of the Roman text. The work of
Bartolus was influential well into the nineteenth century, i.e., until the
codification movement, which replaced the CorpusJurisCivilis as the main
source of civil law.39
Bartolus clearly adhered to the real entity view of the corporation.
First, he rejected the artificial entity view that permission by the state is
needed to set up a corporation: "If some people want to settle in some
place, and create a city, castle, or village, they can do so, as it is permitted
by the law of nations." 4' This is understandable because by Bartolus' time
the Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist as a force in Italian political
life and the Italian city-states were independent municipal corporations.4
Second, Bartolus clearly envisaged the corporation remaining even
if all of its members perish: "What if this university [Perugia] were to
perish by pestilence, and nobody remained? ...The privileges would

38

The reference to the Pope may be a reflection of the work ofAccursius' contemporary
InnocentIV, who developed the concept of the corporation as artificial entity and applied it to the
Church. See, e.g., INNOCENT IV, Commentary on X.2.12.4: "From this we order, and because of
it we say, that whenever the priest and all the clergy of a church die, nevertheless the property
remains in Christ who lives forever, or in the universal Church, which never dies." Similarly: "A
corporate body, like a chapter, the people, and similar [entities], are legal names, not persons, and
therefore they cannot be excommunicated." Id.on X.5.39.52; "It is proper that they swear through
one, because a college in a case of the corporate body is fictively considered a person." Id. on
X.2.20.57 n.5.
3
For development of the corporate personality between Bartolus and the nineteenth
century, see, e.g., THOMAS J. KILCULLEN, THE COLLEGIATE MORAL PERSON AS PARTY LITIGANT
(1947) (canon law); F.M. HUSSEN-DE GROOT, RECHTSPERSONEN IN DE 19E EEUW: EEN STUDIE
VAN PRIVAATRECHTLIJKE RECHTPERSONEN IN DE 19E EEUWSE WETGEVING VAN FRANKRIJK,
NEDERLAND EN DUITSLAND [JURIDICAL PERSONALITIES IN THE 19TH CENTURY: A STUDY OF
PRIVATE LAW JURIDICAL PERSONALITIES IN THE 19TH CENTURY JURISPRUDENCE OF FRANCE, THE

NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY] (1976) (France, the Netherlands, Germany); FREDERICK HALLIS,
CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1930) (England).
4
BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERATO, Commentary on Dig. 3.4.1.1 (cited above) (1653).
4
Following the death of Emperor Frederick 11 (1250), there was a long interregnum
which weakened the empire and strengthened the Italian city states. The premature death of Henry
VII (1314) effectively eliminated the last chance that the Empire would be restored to the position
it held in the middle of the twelfth century. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, VITANUOVA [THE NEW LIFE]
(1988).
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remain in the place where it was. 42 This commentary was probably written
after the Black Death of 1347-1348 swept through Europe, so it reflects the
reality of Bartolus' time. But it also goes beyond Accursius and Ulpian to
reject the aggregate view.
Instead, Bartolus developed the concept of the corporation as
persona representata-alegal personality that is separate from both the
state and its members-but that had to act through agents. For example:
A corporate body is a legal name, and it does not have a soul
or an intellect. Therefore it cannot commit crimes ....
Others say, that corporate bodies can commit crimes .... We
must consider first, whether a corporate body differs from its
members? Some say no, like the philosophers and canonists,
who hold that the whole does not really differ from its parts.
The truth is, that if we speak about reality proper, those say
the truth. For a university of scholars is nothing other than
the scholars. But according to legal fiction they err. For a
university represents a person, which is different than the
scholars, or its members .... Thus, if some scholars leave and

others return, nevertheless the university stays the same.
Similarly if all members of a people die and others take their
place, the people is the same.., and thus a corporate body is
different from its members, by legal fiction, because it is a
represented person.... [Thus] a corporate body can commit
crimes of omission, because the corporate body itself omits,
even though it is done by the negligence of its rulers....
[Some crimes of commission] can be committed by corporate
bodies, nor can it be said that somebody private did it, but the
corporate body itself... [murder and other acts of violence]

cannot be committed by the corporate body itself, for that
requires a real person ...

but they can be committed by its

rulers.., but it cannot be beheaded, as it has no real head, but
only a fictive one.43
This text shows that Bartolus had a clear vision of the corporation as
separate both from the state and from its members. It was a "legal fiction"
that could have the basic attributes of legal personality, i.e., the capacity to
own property, sue and be sued, and even commit crimes, although in all
42

BARTOLUS, supranote 40, Commentaryon Dig. 47.22.4. See also id. on Dig. 3.4.7.2:
"Even though the individuals change, the corporate body remains the same."
4
ald. on Dig. 48.19.16.10.
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these respects it had to act through its agents, and it was not subject to
certain kinds of punishment.'
What enabled Bartolus to go beyond his Roman and medieval
sources to reach this conclusion? In part, it was a natural evolution of
moving away from and beyond the ancient text through the process of
commentary and debate, which can also be seen in medieval commentary
on Aristotle.45 Interestingly, it was the rise of universities that enabled this
unique process of comment and debate to take place in the West, and the
rise of6universities in turn was premised on the availability of the corporate
4

form.

But Bartolus was also influenced by external factors, the most
important of which were the decline of the Holy Roman Empire, which led
to the abandonment of the artificial entity theory that corporations needed
imperial permission to exist, and the rise of independent corporations in
Italy such as the city state and the Italian universities. For these
corporations to maintain their independence, they needed to be seen as
separate both from the state and from their members, because even the
collective membership could perish. Bartolus and his colleagues did not
want the privileges and property of the university to revert to the Popes or
the Emperors should the membership change all at once. Hence, the natural
theory for Bartolus to embrace as representative of the university was the
real entity theory, which enabled the university to maintain its
independence both from the state and from its members.
We thus see that in the period between the classical Roman jurists
in the second century AD and the Commentators in the fourteenth century
the concept of the corporation as a legal person gradually evolved, and that
as this evolution proceeded all three theories of the corporation (aggregate,
artificial entity, and real entity) were brought forward by various legal
commentators. We also see that in the end, aided by external factors such
as the decline of the state, the real entity theory, which most closely reflects
the views and interests of corporate management, emerges as the dominant
theory. As we shall see, this pattern of debate among the three theories
followed by the triumph of real entity theory is typical of subsequent
transformations in the role of the corporation, as well.

"See also id, Commentary on Dig. 41.2.2 (corporate body as represented body can
possess property); id. on Dig. 34.5.21 (an inheritance left to the corporate body is not the same

as an inheritance left to its members)..
4'See, e.g., AVI-YONAH, supra note 14.
461d
47See Avi-YONAH, UNIVERSITAS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
FROM LABEO TO BARTOLUS (1989).
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B. Second Transformation:
From Non-Profit to For-ProfitCorporations
The period between Bartolus (mid fourteenth century) and the late
eighteenth century was one of relative stability in the development of the
corporate form. The corporation was established as a membership
corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who selected their own
successors, as do the President and Fellows of Harvard College to this day,
for example. As such, a corporation had legal personality-the rights to
own property, sue and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such
"chestnuts."48 Private corporations were used primarily for non-profit
purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities), but by the eighteenth century
there were also some commercial corporations (e.g., the East India
49
Company).
From our perspective, there were two significant developments in
this period. The first was the reassertion of royal control over corporations;
in England and other European countries corporations could only be
established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that although in Roman law
corporations could be established without "the prince's consent," "with us
in England, the king's consent is absolutely necessary."5 ° Second, some
degree of outside control over management was established through the
institution of the committee of visitors, which represented the interests of
the founder and of the wider community. 5'
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the
corporation prevailed throughout this period and management (the
members) were firmly in control. "A corporation aggregate of many is
invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the
law."52 As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to relatively little
outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are "artificial persons,
who may maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal
immortality."53 When the members

48

ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1989). As we have seen, these "chestnuts"
were not at all self-evident.
49
See the classification and description of various corporations in 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. 18 (1765).
50
Id. at 460; Tipling v. Pexall, 3 Bulstrode 233 (1614) ("the King creates them"). For
an example of a charter enumerating corporate legal rights, see Case ofSutton IsHospital,77 Eng.
Rep. 937 (1612) (KB).
"BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 467-69.
52
Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. at 973.
53
BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 455.
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are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their
successors are then considered as one person in law: as one
person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense
of the majority of the individuals ... for all the individual
members that have existed from the foundation to the present
time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in
law, a person that never dies. 4
This one person then acquires all the rights of corporations, including
perpetual succession, the right to sue and be sued, the right to own
property, to have a common seal, to make by-laws, and to be subject to
certain criminal liabilities.55 The king constituted corporations, and the
king or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but
once established, the corporation (i.e., its members) remained subject to
relatively little outside regulation.
This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable,
especially since the members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate
debts.56 But the English Kings were very cautious with granting corporate
charters, especially in the case of for-profit enterprises; only corporations
that were clearly vested with a public purpose and benefited the public fisc,
like the East India and Hudson Bay Companies, received royal approval,
and accumulated vast power. As more capital was required for commercial
enterprises this resulted in promoters organizing corporations with
transferable shares and claiming that under authority of a lost or obsolete
charter the shareholders enjoyed limited liability. After the South Sea
Bubble burst in 1720, this problem (and the desire of the South Sea
Company to retain its monopoly) led to the Bubble Act, under which it
became a crime to organize such corporations without explicit royal
consent.17 Although prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant
that the entire Industrial Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place
outside the corporate form and without limited liability.58 The Bubble Act

'41d. at 456.
"Id. at 463-64.
56
Although this was not clear in the Roman sources, it was well established by
Blackstone's time for royally chartered corporations. "The debts of a corporation, either to or
from it, are totally extinguished by its dissolution, so that the members cannot recover, or be
charged with them, in their natural capacities." Id. at 472 (citing Ulpian).
57The Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I c. 18 (1720). See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH
LAW: ENTERPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 64-65 (2000).
58

For attempts to avoid the Bubble Act which led to prosecutions, see King v. Dodd,
103 Eng. Rep. 670 (1808) (K.B.), and King v. Webb, 480 Eng. Rep. 65 8, 663-64 (1811) (K.B.).
See HARRIS, supra note 57.
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was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the Industrial Revolution was over,
but with the provision of unlimited liability for shareholders, which
continued to be the rule in England until 1855." 9

This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state
control over corporations through restrictions on charters, meant that the
next great shift in the use of corporate form took place in the fledgling
United States. There, once the revolution was over, every state could issue
corporate charters. The result was an explosion of charters for commercial
enterprises. One of the first treatises written on corporate law was Joseph
Angell and Samuel Ames' Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations
Aggregate, published in Boston in 1832.60 Angell and Ames begin their
book by stating:
The reader does not require to be told, that we have in our
country an infinite number of corporations aggregate, which
have no concern whatever with affairs of a municipal nature.
These associations we not only find scattered throughout
every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are
they in all the varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them
directing the concentration of mind and capital to .

.

. the

encouragement and extension of the great interests of
commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing. There is a great
difference in this respect between our own country, and the
country from which we have derived a great portion of our
laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be
the management of municipal concerns, is most generally
done by a combination of individuals, established by mere
articles of agreement. On the other hand, what is done here
by the co-operation of several persons is, in the greater
number of instances, the result of a consolidation effected by
an express act or charter of incorporation.61
59

Bubble Act Repeal, 6 Geo. IV c. 91 (1825); Limited Liability Act, 18 & 19 Vict. C.

133 (1855).

60

Angell and Ames were preceded by the English work of John Kyd, published in
London in 1793, but that treatise was devoted primarily to municipal corporations. See JOSEPH
K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE

vi (1832). The Angell & Ames treatise was very successful, with eleven editions published until
1875.
6
Id. at v; see also id at 35:
In no country have corporations been multiplied to so great an extent, as in our
own. . . . There is scarcely an individual of respectable character in our

community, who is not a member of, at least, one private company or society
which is incorporated ....

Acts of incorporation are moreover continually
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The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States
was the second great transformation in the role of the corporation in
society: from primarily a non-profit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As
Judge Kent stated:
[T]he multiplication of corporations in the United States, and
the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen in
consequence of the power which a large and consolidated
capital gives them over business of every kind; and the facility
which the incorporation gives to the management of capital,
and the security which it affords to the persons of its
members, and to their property not vested in the corporate
stock.62
This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the
centuries-old debate about the nature of the corporate form and its
relationship to the shareholders and to the state. This debate can be seen
if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by the first great American
jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall's opinions, written decades apart,
are particularly relevant here: Bank of the United States v. Deveaux
(1809),63 Trustees ofDartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 and Bank
of the United States v. Dandridge (1827).65 These opinions represent the
evolution of his thinking on corporations, which moved from the aggregate
view (Deveaux) to the artificial entity view (Dartmouth College) to the real
entity view (Dandridge).
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the
Savannah branch of the Bank of the United States, a corporation
established by Congress in 1791, during the early struggles around
federalism. The Bank was a membership corporation ("The President,
Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States") and all the
members were citizens of Pennsylvania. The Bank refused to pay the tax
and the State sent its collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the Bank
sued the collectors in federal court, claiming diversity jurisdiction. The
issue facing the court was whether a corporation made up of members from
one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on diversity

solicited at every session of the legislature.
62
1d. at 36 (citing 2 Kent's Com. 219). The last sentence refers to limited liability,
which will be discussed infra.
639 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64-65 (1809).
6417 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 550, 551-54 (1819).

6325 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91-92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 781 2005

2005]

THE CYCLICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CORPORATE FORM

787

grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that "the
individual character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the
corporation, that the court cannot take notice of it," and the contrary view
that "a corporation is composed of natural persons," i.e., between the entity
(artificial or real) and aggregate views.66
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the
corporation itself, "that mere legal entity," cannot be a citizen or sue in
federal court, unless it can be regarded as "a company of individuals. 6 7
However, since the reasons that led Congress to enact diversityjurisdiction
applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to see the
controversy as being between the members "suing in their corporate
character" and their opponents. 68 "The controversy is substantially between
aliens, suing by a corporate name, and a citizen .. . in this case the
69
corporate name represents persons who are members of the corporation. 9
The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue
involving corporations. In the famous Dartmouth College case, the state
of New Hampshire attempted to alter the charter of Dartmouth College
(incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in 1769, under the
name of The Trustees of Dartmouth College) by transferring the
appointment of trustees to the state, thereby effectively taking it over. The
trustees obj ected, arguing that the charter constituted a contract and altering
it violated the contracts clause of the Constitution.7 °
Marshall held that because the College was a private corporation, its
charter was a contract and was protected by the contracts clause. He began
by noting that the funds for the College came from private sources and its
educational character did not make it public either. He then got to the heart
of the question-whether the act of incorporation by the state makes it
possible for the state to take it over. In frequently quoted language,
Marshall held that "[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
'
existence. 71

"Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 63-64.
67
d.at 86-87.
6

ld. at 87-88.

69

1d. at 91.

7

°Trustees ofDartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 557.

71

1d. at 636.
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This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation.
But Marshall then went on to note that, having created the corporation, the
state may not treat it as a mere extension of itself: "this being does not
share in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for
which it was created."72
Even though its object is to promote
governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into mere
instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists to represent the
interest of the founder and his descendants in the aims for which it was
founded.73 This interest in the United States is protected by the contracts
clause, although in England, Marshall recognized that Parliament had the
power to annul the charter.74 In this country, "the body corporate, as
possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely
representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights
which are protected by the constitution."7 5
It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not
take over a private corporation, even one founded for public ends, the
emphasis on the artificial nature of the corporation left ample room for state
regulation via the original charter. Since states were busy granting charters
by the hundreds, the Dartmouth opinion enabled the states to regulate
corporations, should they wish to do so.
Six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the nature
of corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.76
The case involved a suit by the Bank on a bond executed by Dandridge, one
of its cashiers, in which the defendant argued that the bond had never been
approved by the Board of Directors, as required by the charter of
incorporation. The key issue was whether the level of evidence required
of corporations was higher than that required of individuals, since
corporations are incapable of acting not in writing. Justice Story, for the
Court, held that no distinction should be made: "the same presumptions are
. ..applicable to corporations. 7 7 Marshall, however, dissented. He
argued:
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct
from the individuals who compose it, must be endowed with
a mode of action peculiar to itself, which will always

721d

71Id. at 642.
74
Trustees ofDartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 642-43.
751d. at 654.
76

See Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827).
"Id at 70.
HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 783 2005

2005]

THE CYCLICAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE CORPORATE

FORM

789

distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This
to its own nature....
faculty must be exercised according
78
This can be done only in writing.
The Court's view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall's view was
more consistent with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from
its members, individually or collectively. It certainly forms an interesting
contrast with the views he expressed in the Deveaux case sixteen years
earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall's view of the corporation
from aggregate (Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real
(Dandridge)? In part, this stems from the circumstances of these particular
cases. In Deveaux, Marshall wanted to confer diversity jurisdiction to
protect a federal institution (he was after all a Federalist), and the only way
to do so was to look through the corporation to its members. In Dartmouth
College, the issue involved the relationship between private corporations
(albeit "imbued with a public purpose"; the full fledged private/public
distinction had not yet evolved) and the state, and Marshall emphasized the
role of the state in creating the corporation, while placing clear limits on its
ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were required as
the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for-profit business
corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over purely
private businesses. The result in DartmouthCollege favored in practice the
real entity view, because once a private corporation was created, it could
no longer be taken over or perhaps even be overly regulated by the state.
Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he came to write his
Dandridge dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even though it
contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which is not mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period
strengthened the real entity view and weakened the aggregate and artificial
entity views of the corporation: the rise of limited liability and the spread
of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened the aggregate
view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity view.
First, limited liability: As we have seen, in England limited liability
did not exist for corporations until 1855. In the United States, however,
79
most states adopted limited liability in the 1830s. In their second edition,
Angell & Ames explain that this was the primary distinction between a
partnership and a corporation:

78
1d. at
79

91-92.
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 11-

12(1993).
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In every private unincorporated company, the members are
liable for the debts without limitation, whereas in
incorporated societies, they are only liable to the extent of
their shares .... It is frequently the principal object, in this
and in other countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to
limit the risk of the partners to their shares in the stock of the
association; and prudent men are always backward in taking
stock when they become mere copartners as regards their
personal liability for the company debts.80
When Angell & Ames wrote this limited liability was by no means a
universally established rule for corporations; 8' they were thus trying to
establish the law as much as describing the law that existed. Their main
argument, familiar from current debates on limited liability,82 was that
"[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading associations, as
by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of property
for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from
' 83
doing so, were not their liability limited.
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most ofthe states
established limited liability.84 Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in
the emphasis on the aggregate theory, because the aggregate view of
corporations tends to reduce the distinction between the corporation and its
members or shareholders, which is at the heart of limited liability.85
80

ANGELL&AMESsupra note 60, at 23; see also id at 349: "No rule of law we believe

is better settled, than that, in general, the individual members of a private corporate body are not
liable for the debts."
8RBLUMBERG, supra note 79, at 11-12.
82
See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The LimitedFuture of UnlimitedLiability:A Capital

Markets Perspective, 102 YALEL.J. 387,388 (1992); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do

the CapitalMarkets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE
L.J. 427 (1992); Henry Hansmann & ReinierKraakman, TowardUnlimitedShareholderLiability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE LJ. 1879 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson,A Control-BasedApproach
to ShareholderLiabilityfor CorporateTorts, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2002).
3
9 ANGELL & AMES, supra note 60, at 24. Angell and Ames go
on to argue that states
who pursue the contrary policy, like Massachusetts, "drive millions of capital into the neighboring

states for investment"-an early instance of a "race" (to the top or bottom). Id. at 362.
4

This was subject to one limitation, the "trust fund" doctrine, which held that the
capital stock of corporation was to be held in trust for paying corporate debts and thus could not

be distributed to shareholders while debts were outstanding. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas.

435, 439-40 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
85
SeegenerallyMargaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:What CorporateLawAchieved
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 388-90 (2003)

(arguing that the main purpose of incorporation in the nineteenth century was to "lock in" capital
in the firm because shareholders cannot force distributions, in exchange for limited liability);
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The EssentialRoleof OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE L.J.
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The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases
from the period 1839-1844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated
Marshall's opinion in Deveaux. In Bank ofAugusta v. Earle,the Court held
that a corporation incorporated by Georgia may execute a valid contract in
Alabama on comity grounds, but it rejected the argument that Alabama was
required to accept the contract on the basis of the privileges and immunities
clause applied directly to the corporation's members (as required by the
aggregate view), stating that Deveaux has never been extended that far.
Chief Justice Taney emphasized that he rejected the aggregate view
because of its implications for limited liability, as well as its implications
for state regulation of the corporations operating in it:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make a
corporation a mere partnership in business, in which each
stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his
property for the debts of the corporation.... Besides, it would
deprive every state of all control over the extent of corporate
franchises proper to be granted in the state.86
In Louisville, Cincinnati,& CharlestonRailroadCo. v. Letson, decided in
1844, the Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that
diversity jurisdiction may arise even when some of the members of a
defendant corporation are citizens of the same state as the plaintiff. 7 The
Court stated that the Deveaux results "have never been satisfactory to the
bar" and that a corporation "seems to us to be a person, although an
artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state [of incorporation], and
therefore entitled, for8 purposes of suing and being sued, to be deemed a
citizen of that state.0
This result was required by the proliferation ofbusiness corporations
having many shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership
corporations of Marshall's early days. As Angell & Ames stated, by 1832
"[j]oint stock companies are composed of persons who seldom know any
thing of the business of the company, but who leave the management of it

387, 393 (2000) (describing the "core defining characteristic of a legal entity" as the "partitioning
off of a separate set of assets in which the creditors of the firm have a prior security interest").
6
S Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839).
8743 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 559 (1844).
88

Id. at 555. See also Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329
(1853) (holding that for diversity purposes a corporation should be deemed a resident of its place
of incorporation). This led to the current rule, adopted in 1958, under which a corporation is for
diversity purposes a citizen of both the state it is incorporated in and the state in which it has its
principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2001).
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entirely to a body of directors, and are contented with receiving such
periodical dividends as the directors think proper to make."89 The
separation of management from ownership, and the rise of limited liability,
rendered the aggregate view implausible.90
Second, general incorporation: The granting of corporate charters by
state legislatures became in the 1820s and 1830s a process fraught with
corruption.9 1 Some Jacksonians reacted by advocating elimination of the
rights of states to grant corporate charters. But the corporate form was so
widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were passed in all the
states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a fee, without
permission by the state legislature.92 This democratizing move meant that
the artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers
from the state, lost most of its appeal because the state was only vestigially
involved in creating corporations. Instead, corporations were viewed as

89

ANGELL & AMES, supra note 60, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
°See also Chief Justice Shaw's statement in Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. 163
(1840), that
[a] board of directors of the banks of Massachusetts is a body recognized by
law. By the by-laws of these corporations, and by a usage, so general and
uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land, they have the general
superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and
constitute, to all purposes of dealing with others, the corporation.
Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine a clearer rejection of the aggregate view.
Similarly, in Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor,decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1859,
the court held that
in corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important
sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they
revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received
from the State in the act of incorporation. The directors convened as a board are
the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers, and like
private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the
performance of any acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition
of this principle is absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose
powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most ordinary business
could not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be executed.
9 N.Y. 207,216 (N.Y. 1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view deriving from
the membership corporation could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations with
hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as already existed in the 1850s.
91
See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 60, at 35-36
92
See, e.g., the act adopted in 1837 by Connecticut permitting incorporation of "any
lawful business," 1837 Conn. Pub. Acts 49, and various cases upholding such laws, e.g., Nesmith
v. Sheldon, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 812, 817-19 (1849). See also President Jackson's veto message of
the second bank of the United States, citedin John Merquez Lindin, The Law of EqualityBefore
Equality was the Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1137, 1175 (1999) ("If [the government] would
confine itselfto equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on the high
and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing.") (emphasis omitted).
9
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separate from both their shareholders and the state, and the real entity view
reigned supreme. 93
C. Third Transformation:From Closely-Held
to Widely-Held Corporations
The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was
the proliferation of for profit corporations, incorporated under general
incorporation laws with minimal interference by the state, and whose
shareholders enjoyed limited liability. Those shareholders were, however,
relatively limited in number; despite the Angell & Ames quotation above,
few corporations before 1865 required massive amounts of capital, and
most were small, closely-held enterprises. This enabled the Civil War
income tax on corporate income to be imposed directly on the shareholders
of corporations.94
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads,
followed by the steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate
enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required, and between 1865
and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded, non-owner managed
enterprises gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities. This
was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of consolidation that left
several important business areas dominated by monopolies run by the
''robber barons."
The shift from small, closely-held enterprises to massive, publiclyheld ones once again necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form,
and again all three theories of the corporation appeared. A classic example
of the aggregate view is the Santa Clara case, ultimately decided by the
Supreme Court in 1886. 9' This case is famous for Chief Justice Waite's
statement that "[t]he court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the [equal protection clause] applies to these corporations. We are
all of the opinion that it does. 9 6 Some scholars identified this as an
application of the real entity view to corporations, but Professor Horwitz
has shown by examining Justice Field's opinion in the court below that it
actually represented an application of the aggregate view. Specifically,

93

The same result was obtained in England by the adoption of the Regulation and
Incorporation Act, 1856, ch. 63, § 2, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (Eng.).
94Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REv. 1193, 1212-15 (2004).
95
Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
96d. at 396. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173, 176-83 (1985).
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Field held that the equal protection clause must apply to corporations for
the following reasons:
Private corporations consist of an association of individuals
united for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a
common name in their business and have succession of
membership without dissolution.... But the members do not,
because of such association, lose their right to protection, and
equality ofprotection .... Whatever affects the property of the
corporation-that is, of all the members united by the
common name-necessarily affects their interests ....
So,
therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law
guarantees to persons protection in their property ... the
benefits of the provision are extended to corporations; not to
the name under which different persons are united, but to the
individuals composing the union. The courts will always look
through the name to see and protect those whom the name
represents.97
A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most
remarkable is Field's reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme
Court overturned its results forty years earlier. Similarly, in Pembina
9 8 decided two
ConsolidatedSilver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania,
years later, Justice Field, for the Court, stated that "[u]nder the designation
of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special
purpose .... "199
The artificial entity view, however, was also raised in these cases.
In Santa Clara,the railroad corporations made the argument that because
they were operating under special congressional legislation they should be
regarded as an extension of the federal government and therefore California
could not tax them.100 Field rejected this view, citing Trustees of
DartmouthCollege, but noted that "when the instrumentality is the creation
of the state, a corporation formed under its laws, and is employed or

97

Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 402-03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) (citing United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809)).
98125 U.S. 181 (1888).

"Id. at 189. See also Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 59 (1890) (stating
that "we do not see that the right of the parties in regard to the assets of this corporation differ
from those of a partnership on its dissolution").
'°°Santa Clara Cty., 18 F. at 387.
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adopted by the general government for its convenience . . . it remains
subject to the taxing power of the state."' 0 ' And notably, in Pembina,Field
followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the privileges and immunities
clause applied to corporations because they were not "citizens," even
though the aggregate view he adopted in Santa Claramight have led to the
contrary position. Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the
corporation and the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:
[T]he term citizens, as used in this clause, applies only to
natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance
to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature,
and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has
prescribed.., a grant of corporate existence was a grant of
special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for
certain specified purposes as a single individual, and
exempting2 them, unless otherwise provided, from individual
10
liability.
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel,
decided by the Supreme Court in 1906. The issue was whether an agent of
a corporation could invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination or the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure in the name of the corporation. On the Fifth
Amendment issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination
does not apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the
witness.... The question whether a corporation is a "person"
within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise
...since it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person
of some one of its agents or employees." 3
This is closest to the real entity view because it rejects (like Marshall in
Dandridge)the aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its
shareholders and takes into account the special characteristics of the
corporation itself.

0'Ild at 389.
'°2Pembina Consol., 125 U.S. at 187-88.
'" 3Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
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On the other hand, on the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court at first
emphasized the artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the
state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation
under investigation, and that he was entitled to assert the
rights of the corporation with respect to the production of its
books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear
distinction in this particular between an individual and a
corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit
its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the
State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights
as a citizen ....

Upon the other hand, the corporation is a

creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State and
the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It
can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights
to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it
has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to
hold that a State, having chartered a corporation to make use
of certain franchises, could not in the exercise of its
sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed,
and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose.
. . . While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity
statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with
special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand
when charged with an abuse of such privileges."°

"''Id. at 74-75. Remarkably, the Court applies this analysis to give powers to the
federal government over state corporations:
It is true that the corporation in this case was chartered under the laws of New
Jersey, and that it receives its franchise from the legislature of that State; but
such franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate commerce, must
also be exercised in subordination to the power of Congress to regulate such
commerce, and in respect to this the General Government may also assert a
sovereign authority to ascertain whether such franchises have been exercised in
a lawful manner, with a due regard to its own laws. Being subject to this dual
sovereignty, the General Government possesses the same right to see that its own
laws are respected as the State would have with respect to the special franchises
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Having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the
constitutional right, however, the Court suddenly reverts to the aggregate
view when facing the question whether corporations have any Fourth
Amendment rights at all:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals
under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only
be proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, against unlawful
discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of
modem business activity, and their aggregated capital has
become the source of nearly all great enterprises.' °5
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The
key is the last sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890
and 1906 marked the height of the debate on the rise of the great
corporations. The Court is trying to strike a balance between the rights of
the corporations, which can best be protected under either the aggregate or
the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state, which is best
reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one hand, as the Court states,
"Corporations are a necessary feature of modem business activity" and
must be protected.0 6 On the other hand, the right of the state to regulate
must also be preserved, especially since the context of Hale v. Henkel was
an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the American
Tobacco Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.

vested in it by the laws of the State. The powers of the General Government in
this particular in the vindication of its own laws, are the same as if the
corporation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended to
intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over state corporations.
Id. at 75. This issue came up in the corporate tax debate as well. Avi-Yonah, supra note 94, at
1215-16.
'OHale, 201 U.S. at 76 (citations and emphasis omitted).
1061Id
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Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.'0 7 This involved
first the rejection of the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf
Association v. Greenberg, decided just one year after Hale v. Henkel,
Justice Harlan emphasized that a corporation is a separate entity from its
shareholders, and therefore is not a "citizen" for purposes of the privileges
and immunities clause or entitled to the protection of the due process
clause: "the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against
deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not
artificial, persons."" 8 But by itself this position would have led to too
much state regulation for the Lochner Court. Thus, in Southern Railway
Co. v. Greene, decided in 1909, the Court came outclearly for the position
that the corporation as such was entitled to constitutional protection under
the equal protection clause, without any reference to its shareholders: "the
corporation ... is within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
person within the jurisdiction of the state of Alabama, and entitled to be
of the State which deprives it of the equal
protected against any statute
09
protection of the laws."1
Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by
several factors. The aggregate view was raised by Field and others to
protect the rights of corporations, but it was even more incongruous in the
context of the mega-corporations of the 1890s, with thousands of
shareholders more than in the pre-civil days. It also gave the corporation
too many rights vis-A-vis the state, as seen in Hale v. Henkel and in
Greenberg. The artificial entity view gave the state too much power to
regulate corporations, as the Hale v. Henkel Court came to realize when it
laid out its implications. The real entity view was the most congruent with
business realities as well as the one most suited to some balance between
corporations and the state. By 1909, it was well established as the
' 0°This view was also reflected in contemporary books and law review articles. See,

e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897); George F. Deiser, The
Juristic Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 131, 142 (1908); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of
Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404, 405-06 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 253 (1911); I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of
Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 496 (1912) (all rejecting the aggregate view).
Compare for a statement of the aggregate view. VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW

OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS iii (1882) ("the existence of a corporation as an entity, independent
of its members, is a fiction").
'W. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907).
'°9S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910). Remarkably, this case involves a
discriminatory state tax similar to the one struck down by Field on aggregate grounds in Santa
Clara. See also similar statements in Ludwig v. W. Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 163-64 (1910);
Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 64 (1910); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 36
(1910), which finally eliminated the restrictions imposed byBank ofAugusta v. Earl,38 U.S. 519
(1839). See Horwitz, supra note 96, at 177-78.
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dominant view of the corporation, as reflected in contemporary debates
surrounding the enactment of the corporate tax. 10
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other
contemporary developments: the rise of the businessjudgment rule, and the
decline of the ultra vires doctrine."' The business judgment rule rejected
the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors held powers that
were not delegated from the shareholders and that shareholders could not
normally call into question the exercise of those powers. The ultra vires
doctrine represented the ability of the state to require corporations to adhere
to their charter, and was thus based on the artificial entity view; its decline

thus reinforced the rejection of that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in
Leslie v. Lorillard,decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888.
The court held:
In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their
directors or trustees, courts will not interfere unless the
powers have been illegally or unconscientiously executed....

Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for
equity interference; for the powers of those entrusted with
corporate management are largely discretionary." 2
A year later the same court expanded this statement, holding:

..See Avi-Yonah, supra note 94, at 1215-25.
... Another related development was the strengthening of limited liability resulting from
the demise of the "trust fund" doctrine, which held that the capital stock of a corporation must be
held in trust for the benefit of its creditors. This doctrine, which originated from Justice Story's
opinion in Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435, 439-40 (C.C.D. Me. 1824), was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. 610, 620 (1873), on the basis on the aggregate view
("after all, this artificial body is but the representative of its stockholders, and exists mainly for
their benefit, and is governed and controlled by them through the officers whom they elect"). Id.
at 623. See also WILLIAM W. COOK, STOCK & STOCKHOLDERS 322 (1887). In 1892, however,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota held:
This "trust-fund" doctrine... is not sufficiently precise or accurate to constitute
a safe foundation upon which to build a system of legal rules .... Corporate
property is not held in trust.... Absolute control and power of disposition are
inconsistent with the idea of trust. The capital of a corporation is its property.
. . .[A] corporation is in law as distinct a being as an individual is, and is
entitled to hold property (if not contrary to its charter) as absolutely as an
individual can hold it.
Hospes v. Nw. Mfg. & CarCo., 48 Minn. 174, 192-93 (Minn. 1892). The doctrine then fell into
desuetude, reinforced by the invention of no par stock in the early twentieth century. See Horwitz,
supra note 96, at 194-95.
" 2 Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519, 532 (N.Y. 1888).
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All powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted,
of necessity, must be exercised by the directors who are
constituted by the law as the agency for the doing of corporate
acts. The expression of the corporate will and the performance of corporate functions in the management of a
corporation, may originate with its directors.... Within the
chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate the
concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment.
...In the management of the affairs of the corporation, they
are dependent solely upon their own knowledge of its
business 3and their own judgment as to what its interests
require.' 1

This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that
"it is [the board's] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the
board of directors ... that is to shape [a corporation's] policies or decide

upon its corporate acts. This principle is not disputed, and the citation of
authorities in its support is unnecessary."" 4 The rule reflected the real
entity view, which equates the corporation with its management, and
rejected the aggregate view of the corporation as an aggregate of its
shareholders." 5
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra
vires doctrine, which held that a board could not act contrary to the powers
conferred on it by the state. The ultra vires doctrine thus represented the
artificial entity view. The doctrine originated in the pre-civil war era, 16 but
became prominent in the arguments on the relationship of the state and the
corporation in the 1880s and 1890s." 7 The artificial entity argument for
upholding the limitation was stated clearly by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1888:

" 3 Beveridge v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 112 N.Y. 1, 22 (N.Y. 1889).
4

.. Siegman v. Elec. Vehicle Co., 140 F. 117, 118 (C.C.D. N.J. 1905). See also Manson

v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323 (N.Y. 1918), in which the court held that "[d]irectors are the
exclusive, executive representatives of the corporation and are charged with the administration
of its internal affairs and the management and use of its assets. Clearly the law does not permit
the stockholders to create a sterilized board of directors." Id. (citations omitted).
"it also represented a transition from an agency to a trustee model of the relationship
between shareholders and management. See Millon, supranote 8, at 214-16.
6
" See, e.g., Abbott v. Am. Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 , 591-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1861).
".See, e.g., the extensive discussion in COOK, supra note 111, chs. 19, 38.
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In the granting of charters, the legislature is presumed to have
had in view the public interest; and public policy is (as the
interests of stockholders ought to be) concerned in the
restriction of corporations within chartered limits, and a
departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot
result in prejudice to the public or to the shareholders. As
artificial creations, they have no powers or faculties, except
those with which they were endowed when created ...
Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public
convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and,
so long as they are conducted for the purposes for which
organized, they are a public benefit; but if allowed to engage,
without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their
charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and
monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are
engaged, they become a public menace, against which public
policy and statutes design protection."'
The doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following year.
Referring to the artificial entity doctrine, the Court stated:
It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court
in regard to the powers of corporations, that they are such and
such only as are conferred upon them by the acts of the
legislatures of the several States under which they are
organized. A corporation in this country, whatever it may
have been in England at a time when the crown exercised the
right of creating such bodies, can only have an existence
under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it
is created. And these powers, where they do not relate to
municipal corporations exercising authority conferred solely
for the benefit of the public, and in some sense parts of the
body politic of the State, have in this country until within
recent years always been conferred by special acts of the
legislative body under which they claim to exist. But the
rapid growth of corporations, which have come to take a part
in all or nearly all of the business operations of the country,
and especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations of
capital and individual energy, as well as their success in

... Leslie, 110 N.Y. at 531-33.
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meeting the needs of a vast number of most important
commercial relations, have demanded the serious attention
and consideration of law makers. And while valuable
services have been rendered to the public by this class of
organizations, which have stimulated their formation by
numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they
were attended by many evils in their operation as well as
much good, and that the hasty manner in which they were
created by the legislatures, sometimes with exclusive
privileges, often without due consideration and under the
influence of improper motives, frequently led to bad results. 19
The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed
the ultravires doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New
York and Ohio law. 2 ° In 1895, however, the Supreme Court rejected an
antitrust challenge to the sugar trust on the grounds that the Sherman Act
applied only to corporations engaged directly in interstate commerce.' 2' In
1896, the Court rejected an ultra vires challenge to the ability of the Union
Pacific Railway to lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad, when
the charter would not permit an outright sale.'2 2 This literal decision
significantly reduced the power of the ultra vires doctrine.'2 3
The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court
decision but from the competition among states to attract corporate
charters, which was begun by New Jersey in 1890 and continued by
Delaware in the 1900s.24 This competition meant that New Jersey and

'19 Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1889).
20

1 See People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 626 (1890); State v. Standard
Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 184-85 (Ohio 1892). See also Theodore Dwight, The Legalityof Trusts,
3 POL. SCt. Q. 592 (1888); WILLIAM W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM (1893) (defining a
trust to be "a combination of competing concerns under one management").
'United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17(1895).
122
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 163 U.S. 564, 59496(1896).
23
1 See WILLIAM W. COOK, TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS 971-73 (3d ed.
1894) ("The courts are becoming more liberal, and many acts which fifty years ago would have
been held to be ultra vires would now be held to be intra vires.") (emphasis omitted). By 1898
Cook wrote that "the doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing." WILLIAM W. COOK, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK vii (4th ed. 1898). On this entire
development, see Horwitz, supra note 96, at 186-88.
124
See RUSSEL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 1-26 (1937);
LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 209 (McLure, Phillips & Co. 1906);
Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey and the Great Corporations, 13 HARV. L. REV. 198, 209-11
(1899). On the "race to the bottom/race to the top" debate, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalismandthe Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw,
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Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in their
charters that restricted the power of corporate management.' 25 Thus, for
example, the long-lasting prohibition against corporations owning stock in
other corporations, which led to the necessity of"trusts," was eliminated by
New Jersey in its 1890 law.'26 As a result, although the Supreme Court still
held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires under New York law,

this holding became rather meaningless since most large, publicly traded
corporations were incorporated in New Jersey.127 As the New Jersey statute
explains:
It was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation

in excess of its express powers, or those necessarily implied,
were void, and contracts which were ultra vires the

enforcement or ratification....
corporation were incapable of
28
This rule no longer obtains. 1

The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of

corporate laws permitting incorporation "for any lawful purpose." With the
doctrine gone, the artificial entity view of the corporation29 became less
plausible, and the real entity view reigned supreme again. 1
D. A FailedTransformation: The Hostile Takeover Crisis
In 1926 John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journalin
which he dismissed as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial
entity, and real entity views of the corporation. These views, he explained,
could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he used examples relying on the

105 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections
on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value? 62 J. FIN. EcON. 525 (2001); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection,
andthe Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STuD. 251 (1977).
12See JAMES DILL, TRUSTs-THEIRUSES ANDABUSES (1901); New JerseyLegislating
for the United States, INDIANAPOLIS J., Nov. I1, 1901.
1"6General Corporation Act of New Jersey sec. 51 (1890 rev.). See also id. sec. 104
(authorizing mergers); WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS vi (4th
ed. 1898) (discussing the role of trusts in American corporation law).
27
1 De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 40,58 (1899).
'"General Corporation Law of New Jersey sec. 2 (1896).
'29See Machen, supra note 106, at 257-58. Another significant development in this
period was states passing statutes that allowed a majority of shareholders to sell corporate assets
(before the 1890s, shareholder unanimity was required). This greatly facilitated mergers and also
represented the decline of the aggregate view. See Horwitz, supra note 96, at 201-02.
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cyclical nature of these theories. His conclusion was that theory should be
abandoned for an examination of reality.' 30
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate
personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter,
however, the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded
corporations. The board ran the corporation as it saw fit, protected from
the shareholders by the separation of ownership from management noted
by Berle and Means in the 1930s, and by the business judgment rule, and
protected from the state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by
New Jersey and continued by Delaware.13'
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only
arose in the 1980s. As a result of the invention of the junk bond market, it
suddenly became possible for hostile raiders to threaten takeovers of even
the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was taken private for $25
billion in 1988, it was clear that no board was safe. As a result, debates on
the nature of the corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the
state, which began in the academic literature in the 1970s, once again
became a matter of practical concern. Once again all three theories of the
corporation reappeared, as can be seen if one examines three seminal cases
decided between 1982 and 1989 by the Supreme Courts of the United
States and of Delaware.
Edgarv. MITE Corp.,132 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982,
involved the constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of
Illinois. 33
' Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer
for the shares of a company covered by the act had to be registered by the
Secretary of State and the offeror had to give both the target and the state
a twenty day notice during which only the target could communicate with
its shareholders regarding the offer. The act applied both to corporations
ten percent of whose shareholders were residents of Illinois and to

3

°John Dewey, The HistoricBackground of CorporateLegal Personality,35 YALE
L.J. 655, 673 (1926).
3t
1 This state of affairs prompted Adolph Berle, the prime intellect behind
the
'

shareholder primacy doctrine in the 1930s, to concede defeat in 1956. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr.,
Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University, in RICHARD EELLS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A
FREE SOCIETY 29 (1956):
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E.
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers
were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these
powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument has been
settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd's

contention.
112457 U.S. 624 (1982).
'Id

at 626.
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corporations that were either incorporated in the state or had their principal
office in it. The MITE corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois
corporation and refused to comply with the act, arguing that it violated the
commerce clause.
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority,
Justice White held that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could
apply to tender offers that did not affect a single Illinois shareholder; "the
34
state has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."'
Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an Illinois corporation
was irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation's
"internal affairs": "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by
stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal
affairs of the target company."1 35 Instead, the focus should be entirely on
the impact of blocking the tender offer on the company's shareholders and
their relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block
a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are
deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium.
The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued
use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition,
is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism
to perform well so that stock
provides incumbent management
36
reduced.'
is
high
prices remain
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view: The focus is
entirely on the impact on the corporation's shareholders, and the
corporation itself (including its management) barely exists, as indicated by
the statement that a change in corporate control has no relevance to the
internal affairs of the corporation. The market for corporate control is
praised because of its ability to overcome the agency cost problem and the
incentive it provides for management to maximize stock prices. Moreover,
White quotes the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among the
principal proponents of the "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation,
according to which the corporation is merely a convenient legal term for a
34

1 1d. at 644.

' d.at 645.
Edgar,457 U.S. at 643 (referring to Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1173-74 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for
CorporateControl, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5, 27-28, 45
(1978); H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 12 (1976)).
136
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series of contracts, the most important of which is the contract between
37
shareholders and management.
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and
the real entity theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice
Powell, even though he joined it to provide the crucial fifth vote. Powell
noted that in some cases the state may have a legitimate interest because the
corporation has a real presence that goes beyond a contract between
management and the shareholders, reflecting both the artificial and real
entity views:
I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning
leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers. This
period in our history is marked by conglomerate corporate
formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws.
Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms ofprofessional
personnel experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that
vastly exceed those of the takeover target. This disparity in
resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively .small or
regional target corporation. Inevitably there are certain
adverse consequences in terms of general public interest when
corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and
State. *
The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multinational corporations tend to be located in the large
cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are
transferred out of a city and State into one of these
metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which the
transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management
personnel-many of whom have provided community
leadership-may move to the new corporate headquarters.
Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational
life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also
*

'See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1273 (1982). Fischel stated that "[a] corporation... is nothing more than a legal fiction
that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various individuals have voluntarily entered
into for their mutual benefit." Id. The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a reinvention of
the aggregate view has been made repeatedly. See, e.g., William W. Bratton Jr., The New
Economic Theory ofthe Firm: CriticalPerspectivesfrom History,41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471
(1989); Millon, supra note 8, at 229.
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tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate
headquarters. 3 '
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings
into an opinion for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity
view of the corporation. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica involved
a so-called "second generation" anti-takeover statute, i.e., one that was
drafted to get around the problems which the Illinois statute struck down
in MITE.' 39 The Indiana statute applied only to corporations incorporated
in Indiana, which have a specified number of shareholders within the state,
and which opt for its protection. Under the statute, an acquirer who
acquired "control shares" in such an Indiana target could vote them only
with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested
shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within fifty days after the
acquisition.
The court of appeals followed MITE and declared the statute
unconstitutional under the commerce clause, because it interfered with the
market for corporate control:
"Even if a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the
efficiency with which they are employed and the proportions
in which the earnings they generate are divided between
management and shareholders depends on the market for
corporate control-an interstate, indeed international, market
that the State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of."" °
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority,
stated:
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic
corporations, including the authority to define the voting
rights of shareholders ....We think the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause
analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate
governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and
attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice

'Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646.
"39481 U.S. 69, 80 (1987).
"4°Id.at 77 (quoting Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,264 (7th Cir.
1986)).
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Marshall explained: "A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
14
for which it was created." 1
Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate
transactions affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states.
He argued that the "free market system depends at its core upon the fact
that a corporation ...is organized under, and governed by, the law of a
single jurisdiction. . . . A State has an interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters."' 42 He
explicitly rejected the market for corporate control and its underlying
aggregate theory:
The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to
any particular economic theory . . . there is no reason to
assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may
result from repetitive takeovers necessarily will result in more
effective management or otherwise be beneficial to
shareholders . . the very commodity that is traded in the
"market for corporate control"-the corporation-is one that
owes its existence and attributes to state law. 141
This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly
based on the artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to
the incorporating state and that state may therefore regulate it, including in
ways that affect shareholders' ability to sell their shares. Not surprisingly,
Justice White dissented, arguing that while the statute may help Indiana
corporations "particularly in helping those corporations maintain the status
quo," it is inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes
"economic protectionism."144
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and
the most important state in this regard was Delaware, in which most major

.4 Id. at 89 (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

518, 636 (1819)).

1421d. at 90-91.
143CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 92-94 (citations and emphasis omitted).
-Id. at 98-100.
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U.S. corporations are incorporated. Delaware law was favorable to hostile

takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of Delaware issued an
opinion in ParamountCommunications,Inc. v. Time, Inc. that in practice
ended the hostile takeover boom.'45 Paramount had made a $175 (later
raised to $200) per share offer for Time at the time when Time was about
to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner. Paramount argued that
under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal
(1985)"6 and Revlon (1986), 147 Time was "up for sale" and therefore the
business judgment rule was suspended and Time's board was required to
maximize shareholder value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated that:
Two key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware
law imposes on a board of directors the duty to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation. This broad mandate
includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate
profitability. Thus, the question of"long-term" versus "shortterm" values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally,
are obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its
best interest without regard to a fixed investment horizon.
Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under
Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in
an informed manner, is not under anyperse duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover. 4' 8
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder
value was always required; instead, the board was permitted to pursue its
view of the best long-term corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate
enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board
representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate
enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for
achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be
delegated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged to

14'571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
"4Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
47
' Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
48

1

Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150 (citations omitted).
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abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a shortterm shareholder profit unless49there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.1
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the "Time culture"
(its stated goal, instead of maximizing the cash return to shareholders).
This effectively killed the takeover threat, because any board could find
good long-term share value maximization reasons to reject a superior cash
bid. The Delaware court, in enhancing managerial power, effectively
endorsed the real entity view: a corporation was an entity with its own
corporate culture, which should not be subordinated to the shareholders or
to the state. This view was ratified when the ALI Corporate Governance
Project adopted a rule that corporate boards may take into account the
interests of other "stakeholders," not just the shareholders. 5 0
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that
corporate management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore
the Delaware Supreme Court felt that it had to side with management once
the U.S. Supreme Court had approved the anti-takeover laws of other states,
lest corporations choose to relocate there. It seems unlikely, however, that
this was the only reason; Delaware is very well established as the preferred
state of incorporation, and stock values would likely decrease if
shareholders perceived that management was leaving Delaware just to
protect themselves. Instead, it seems likely that the Delaware Supreme
Court genuinely believed that a corporation like Time had a corporate
existence and culture with implications for other stakeholders, and
therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation with its
shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by
Justice Powell in his concurrence in MITE: A corporation is more than a
"nexus of contracts," and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the
interests of other stakeholders into account. 15'
E. Fourth Transformation:From National Corporations
to MultinationalEnterprises
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the
1950s and is still going on, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge.
This is the transformation from corporations based mostly in one country
to multinational enterprises based in many countries.
49

1 1d. at 1154 (citations omitted).

so ALI, supra note 11, § 2.01(b)(3).

"'Edgar,457 U.S. at 646-47.
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Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas,
have existed since the seventeenth century.5 2 As recently as the 1950s,
however, the shareholders and other sources of capital, the management,
most of the production facilities, and most of the markets of even large
multinationals tended to be in one country, so that "what was good for
G.M. was good for America."' 3 By the 1990s, however, this had changed
profoundly. As more countries opened up to foreign direct investment,
communications improved, many products became lighter and easier to
ship, and more and more corporations became "globalized." In a globalized
multinational corporation, the sources of capital are in many countries: the
shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and
borrowing facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development
and production facilities are likewise spread throughout the globe, as are
markets. The only thing that usually ties a modem multinational to its
home country is the location of management.
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has reopened. There is abundant academic writing on the relationship between
multinationals and the state, and most writers from both the left and the
right concede that this relationship has changed profoundly so that the
home state (the state of incorporation) has become powerless to control
"its" multinationals; it is hard even to identify to which country
multinationals "belong."'5 4 On a practical level this situation has led to
attempts by home states to control the behavior of multinationals abroad in
areas as diverse as trading with the enemy, antitrust, corruption and others,
with varying success.' The most recent development in this regard has
been "inversion" transactions, in which the management changes the
country of incorporation of a multinational's parent corporation.'56 These
transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have
corporate governance implications as well. 7 Specifically, the artificial

112HARRIS, supra note 57, at 39-59.

'53Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ForHaven's Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions,
95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1796 (June 17, 2002).
54
1 EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 86-93 (1995); Robert B. Reich, Who is Us?, 32 HARV. Bus. REv. 53, 53-54
(1990); but see Laura d'Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: WhyAmerican Ownership Still Matters,
AM. PROSPECT 47-49 (Winter 1991).
'PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 126-56 (1996);
RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE'S EYE 215-16 (1998); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National
Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality,and
Harmonization,42 COLUM. J. TRANSNATLL. 5,17-31 (2003); BLUMBERG, supranote 79, at 19394.
56
1 Avi-Yonah, supra note 153, at 1793.
lSId. at 1794-97.

HeinOnline -- 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 806 2005

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 30

entity theory becomes hard to maintain when management can pick weak
countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation for the parent of a
multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as
shareholders now tend to come from many countries. One implication of
this has been that the securities laws of the weakest country tend to
dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage."' Another is academic
proposals to let management choose the country of securities law as well
as the country of incorporation.' On a practical level globalization has led
the SEC to relax requirements for some foreign issuers. 60 This trend has
tended to weaken the applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard
to predict where these trends will lead, but at the moment they appear once
more to favor the real entity view.
To summarize: Throughout all the transformations we have studied,
the same pattern recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state,
to society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of the
corporation emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in a slightly different but
fundamentally similar form. In the end, however, the real entity view
prevails.
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt due
to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate
management, because it shields them from undue interference from both
shareholders and the state. Corporate management wields political power
and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to
the importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate
management. But the very fact that corporate management wields this
power shows that there is another reason why the real entity view prevails:
It fits reality much more than the other two. In some periods (e.g., the
Roman Empire or eighteenth century Europe), the power of the state is
overwhelming and the artificial entity view seems plausible, and in other
periods (the medieval membership corporation, the nineteenth century close
corporation) the aggregate view seems plausible, but in most periods
equating the corporation either with the state or with shareholders must

.58Amir N. Licht, RegulatoryArbitragefor Real: InternationalSecuritiesRegulation
in a World of InteractingSecurities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 563, 591 (1998).
"'5 9Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:Why Issuer's Choice
is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1337(1999) (referencing Stephen J. Choi
& Andrew T. Guzman, PortableReciprocity: Rethinking the InternationalReach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 903,907-08 (1998); Roberta Romano, EmpoweringInvestors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361-62 (1998)).
16°Merritt B. Fox, The PoliticalEconomy of StatutoryReach: US DisclosureRules in
a Globalizing Marketfor Securities, 97 MICH. L. REv. 696, 713-14 (1998).
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have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible.' 61 The real entity
view prevailed because it was more realthan the others. This observation
enables us to move from the historical to the normative part of the
discussion and ask what implications does the reality of corporations have
for corporate law and regulation.
m.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

What are the implications of these cyclical transformations of
corporate theory for the problem of CSR? Can we draw any conclusions
on the legitimacy of CSR from the history described above? It would be
argued that the answer is "yes," and that the dominance of the real entity
theory for most of corporate history has far reaching implications for the
legitimacy of CSR activities for the reasons explained below.

'The real entity view is clearly the dominant one in sociology and some branches of
economics. As one sociologist has stated, "The recurrent problem in sociology is to conceive of
corporate organization, and to study it, in ways that do not anthropomorphize it and do not reduce
it to the behavior of individuals or of human aggregates." Guy E. Swanson, The Tasks of
Sociology, 192 ScI. 665,666 (1976). A whole branch of economic sociology centers on the study
of organizations, and there are numerous books devoted to the topic. Most of these books revolve
around the study of large corporations, since these are the dominant forms of organization in this
society. See generallyTHE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W.
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds. 1991); JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE
EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978,
reissued 2003); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS
(5th ed. 2003); JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY (1967, reissued 2003); THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY
(Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds. 1994), especially Part II, Section C, The Sociology of
Firms, Organizations, and Industry. Moreover, they are informed by the economic perspective
inaugurated by R.H. Coase in his classic "Nature of the Firm" article from 1937, and developed
by Oliver Williamson and others into transaction cost economics. Ronald Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and
Organization Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 77-107; for a
critique see Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM J. SOC. 481 (1985). This branch of economics, which now forms part of
the "new institutional economics," begins by recognizing that the firm is fundamentally different
from the market because of its hierarchical structure, and proceeds to investigate when operating
as a firm as opposed to buying in the market makes sense (the "make or buy" issue). Recently,
transaction cost economics has become the leading explanation for the most recent transformation
of the corporation-the rise of multinational enterprises. CHRISTOS PITELIS & ROGER SUGDEN,
THE NATURE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM (1991).
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A. The Three Theories and CSR
Each of the three theories of the corporation permits a different level
of CSR, as indicated in the following table:
Table 1: Theories of the Corporation and CSR
THEORY
Aggregate

Artificial

Real

For long-run benefit of
shareholders

Yes

Yes

Yes

Not for shareholders,
Corporation responsible

No

Yes

Yes

Not for shareholders,
Corporation not responsible

No

No

Yes

Type of CSR

The first type of CSR involves activities that can clearly and
demonstrably benefit shareholders in the long run. For example, actions
that prevent environmental disasters or comply with legal and ethical rules
can have a significant positive effect in preventing disastrous corporate
calamities, even if they cost money in the short run. Thus, even proponents
of the aggregate theory, the currently dominant theory of the corporation
in academic circles, would support this type of CSR.
The second type of CSR involves activities that are designed to
mitigate social harms the corporation was responsible for, even when there
is no direct legal responsibility, and when no benefit to the shareholders
can be shown. Under the aggregate theory, such activities should not be
permitted because they do not benefit shareholders. But under the artificial
entity theory, since it emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence
derived from the state, an implicit contract can be inferred that the
corporation will help the state in mitigating harms that it causes even in the
absence of legal responsibility. Otherwise, the state will have to bear this
burden imposed by the corporation it created.
Finally, the third type of CSR involves activities like AIDS
prevention, for which the corporation is not responsible and which in most
cases do not benefit its shareholders, even in the long run. This type of
CSR would not be permitted under the aggregate or artificial entity
theories. But under the real entity theory, since the corporation is regarded
as a person just like individuals, it is permitted to act philanthropically just
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like individuals are, and should, in fact, be praised to the extent it does
SO.

162

Thus, under the real theory, even CSR activities that have nothing to
do with benefiting shareholders or with direct corporate responsibility are
permitted. This still requires an answer to the two
arguments advanced by
63
Levitt, Friedman, Jensen, and their colleagues.1
First, there is the argument that the money being spent on CSR
belongs to the shareholders and therefore management have no right to
spend it according to their preferences in ways that are not related to
maximizing shareholder value. As long as the corporation's CSR activities
are adequately disclosed to the shareholders (and the securities laws are
designed to assure such disclosure is made), it is not clear that they have a
right to complain. If the shareholders do not like the firm engaging in CSR
activities, they can sell the shares and invest solely in firms that do not
engage in such activities. Even in today's world, it is unlikely that
shareholders will find it difficult to eschew firms that engage in CSR,
although most large publicly traded firms do so.
Moreover, it can be argued that the majority of current shareholders,
namely those who invest through mutual funds and pension funds, invest
primarily to obtain a secure return and not for maximum, but risky, gains.
In this sense, most shareholders today are more like bondholders or
preferred shareholders, who care more about a stable return than about
value maximization. For those shareholders, firnms that promise a secure,
reasonably high return are a good investment, even if they reduce the
chances of obtaining returns over that limit by engaging in CSR. Those
shareholders who seek to maximize returns are then free to invest in firms
that do not engage in CSR.
Second, there is the argument that if firms are free to engage in CSR,
it will be more difficult to evaluate management performance since there
will be no single benchmark like earnings per share. This may be true, but
in a complex world, we are used to evaluating leaders on more than one
benchmark. We would not seriously argue that political leaders, for
example, must be evaluated only on their economic performance and on no
other measure. If we can use complex measures to evaluate politicians, we
can do the same for CEOs.
Finally, as Chen and Hanson point out, there is an internal
inconsistency in Milton Friedman's argument, because if markets are
efficient they should prevent managers from engaging in actions that are

'62JAMEs BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW & LEGAL
EDUCATION 111-23 (1999).

'See articles cited supranote 8.
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not in the best interest of shareholders."6 Friedman may, in fact, have
believed that to be the case, but the dominance of the real entity view of the
corporation through 2,000 years of corporate history suggests that
management usually finds a way to do as they wish, including engaging in
CSR when it may not be in the long-term interest of shareholders. Since
the courts are unable to effectively police such behavior and markets are an
insufficient constraint, it is unclear what in practice is gained by arguing in
favor of shareholder primacy and against CSR.
Thus, if the historical argument advanced above is correct, and real
entity theory is, in fact, the dominant theory of the corporation for most of
its history because it is a more accurate description of reality than either the
artificial entity or aggregate theories, this can justify CSR to a much greater
extent than is commonly accepted by most corporate law academics. Why,
then, has the aggregate (nexus of contracts) theory achieved such success
in U.S. academic circles? The answer requires a comparative perspective.
B. The Three Theories and Varieties of Capitalism:
A ComparativePerspective
Political economists distinguish among three types of advanced
capitalist societies. Under the "varieties of capitalism" framework,
economies can be differentiated by their comparative institutional
advantages. In general, economies can be characterized as either liberal
(market economies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom),
corporatist (organized market economies that rely on tightly integrated
private and networked associations to resolve significant dilemmas of
economic integration, such as Germany and Japan), or statist (depending
on hierarchical solutions in resolving coordination problems, such as
France).' 65
The varieties of capitalism framework suggests that firms in each of
the three models of economic governance will distinguish themselves in
different fields. In liberal market economies, the advantages of a flexible
regulatory structure benefits industries targeting low costs and those
operating in sectors characterized by radical innovation (e.g., software, bio
technology). In corporatist economies, high levels of business coordination
benefit sectors that rely on long-term contracts, and firms that specialize in
high quality, scale intensive and specialized supplier industries (autos,
machine tools, chemicals). Statist economies favor large scale-intensive

"6Chen& Hanson, supra note 6, at 42-66.
65

1 VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE

ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds. 2001).
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industries that have long time horizons or require major capital investment
(autos, transport).' 66
There is an obvious correlation between the three varieties of
capitalism described by political economists and the three historical
theories of the firm outlined above. The liberal model of the United
Kingdom and the United States, with its emphasis on arm's-length
relationships and public trading, best fits the aggregate theory of the firm.
The statist, hierarchical model of France, with its emphasis on the
relationship between the firm and the state, best fits the artificial entity
model. The German and Japanese style corporatist model best fits the real
entity theory.
This relationship can also explain why in Europe CSR is much less
controversial than in the United States Practically every European Union
government (including even the United Kingdom) has programs designed
to foster CSR.' 67 These kind of programs are hard to imagine in the U.S.
context given the widespread hostility to CSR.
Fundamentally, therefore, the debate around CSR is linked to another
wide-spread debate in corporate law: Whether corporate law is destined to
"converge" on the U.S. model of publicly traded corporations with
dispersed share ownership, or whether other models (such as the German
and Japanese models) are viable. The aggregate, nexus of contracts theory
is closely linked to the U.S. corporate governance model, while other
models are much more open to CSR. Recent literature has given rise to
doubts about the convergence hypothesis, but this debate will no doubt
continue. 168
The purpose of this article has been to show, however, that even in
the U.S. context the aggregate theory has not always been dominant. In
fact, throughout most of the history described above, the real theory was the
dominant one, and it can be argued that in practice most corporations are
still operating on the basis of the real theory, not the aggregate one. Thus,
CSR is most easy to justify in all its forms on the basis of the real theory of
the corporation and is likely to remain practiced for the future. The debate
on CSR should, therefore, shift from whether CSR is acceptable to how to

'66ORFEO

FIORETOS, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND

IN POST-WAR EUROPE 11-12 (2004).
MULTILATERALISM
67

1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: NATIONAL PUBLIC

POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004).

168Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownershipand Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127, 127 (1999); Mark J. Roe, A PoliticalTheory
of American CorporateFinance, 91 COLuM. L. REv. 10 (1991); Mark D. West, The Puzzling
Divergence of CorporateLaw: Evidence and Explanationsfrom Japan and the UnitedStates,
150 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 601 (2001).
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make it more accountable and
effective in obtaining social goals-but that
69
is an issue for another day.

169See James P. Walsh & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Unfettered Corporation: Corporate

Social Responsibility and the Coming Crisis of Corporate Control (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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